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Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 
I thank Professor Bishop for his comments. My 
response focuses very briefly on five issues, the ftrSt of 
which is actually a two-pronged clarification. 
1. When Professor Bishop states that "in the case of 
iconic bodily representation, the channel employed by 
the sender of a message is the sender's own body" but 
that "in the relevant cases ofhuman language, ... speech 
is the channel of communication," he confuses 
similarity in iconic bodily representation between 
primordial language and the Tanzsprache with speech 
perception. I never said that human speech perception 
bad something to do with iconicity. I said that it had to 
do with tactile-kinesthetic experience and on these 
grounds likened it to bees' dance-speech. Secondly, my 
own wording has in one place confused the issue. 
Present-day human language is not iconic. Linguistic 
studies show, however, that primordial language was. 
Hence my comparison between primordial language and 
the Tanzsprache. 
2. Professor Bishop remarks that the comparative 
method Hockett uses is the familiar one used in 
evolutionary biology. But it is not. Hockett himself 
claims merely that his method is "modeled on that of 
the wologist." Even to say modeled is saying a lot. The 
difference is well exemplified by Professor Bishop 
himself when in describing what be calls Hockett's 
"plausible method," he states that "We assume that the 
communication systems of our ancestors were similar 
to those of certain extant nonhuman animals. We then 
compare their communication systems with our own in 
order to determine what sorts of changes had to have 
occurred in order for human language to develop." But 
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this is not what Hockett does. He does not start with 
the study of extant nonhuman animal communication. 
He starts with what he labels "the design features" of 
human language. In effect, his comparison shows what 
nonhuman animals don't have, not what they do have. 
Moreover, we cannot assume a similarity between the 
communication systems of extant nonhuman animals 
and ancestral hominid speech in the first place because 
none of those systems involves the tongue. In fact, 
extant nonhuman primates do not have tongues of the 
shape or flexibility necessary to human speech. 
3. Professor Bishop says that Hockett "adduces" 
thirteen design features. We must ask from where 
Hockett adduces them. We do not have to look very 
far, since they clearly come from human language. How 
can it then be contingent that, as Professor Bishop 
maintains, "humans are the only beings that use 
language." We have known from the start that it is 
contingent because, tongues aside, as fully developed 
systems, animate communicative systems are species­
specific. Hence, ifwe choose the design features ofone 
system against which all other communication systems 
are to be judged, we are quite arbitrarily deciding what 
we will defme as language. We are giving a stipulative 
defmition that could just as well have stipulated other 
design features. An evolutionary psychologist put this 
point very well when he remarked of Hockett's ftrst 
design feature, a vocal-auditory channel, that it is a 
"somewhat anthropocentric restriction." Indeed, why 
aren't tactility or gesture represented? They too are 
"channels." Arbitrariness is itself a wholly arbitrary 
design feature; all creatures whose communication 
systems demonstrate iconicity are excluded on a 
technicality. Ironically, on the basis of the evidence, 
this includes ancestral hominids---our direct kinfolk. 
4. Professor Bishop comments that I seem 
"particularly harsh" with Hockett given the difficulty 
in reconstructing the origin of language. My harshness 
is in part due to the ease with which Hockett meets that 
difficulty and the ease with which many people accept 
his ease. Professor Bishop is nonetheless right in 
faulting me for saying that Hockett's model is 
ahistorical. It is historical to the extent that it sets out 
design features on an evolutionary grid. The problem 
is that the grid gives us no indication whatsoever about 
bow the pinnacle creatures on the grid, those slowly 
evolving hominids, were wagging their tongues in 
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various ways until finally they achieved language, or if 
they were not wagging their tongues, how their quite 
other communication system turned into language. As 
linguist Pulleyblank said, Hockett's "brilliantly 
successful mutation" won't do. The absence ofstepping 
stones from the nonlinguistic to the linguistic is 
precisely what makes the schema Athena-like. 
5. Finally, the focus ofmypaper is on the possibility 
of an evolutionary semantics, specifically on what is in 
the way of forging such a semantics. It is this task in 
which I am interested. Clearing the path toward this 
task and the task itself I believe to be of momentous 
import to philosophy and to the values people bold in 
their everyday and professional lives. For these very 
reasons I do not believe an evolutionary semantics to 
be simply a matter of recording differences and 
similarities between us and them, and then admonishing 
ourselves to act in certain more putatively humane ways. 
An evolutionary semantics should itself carry us over 
into a morality-and this on the basis of the sense­
making it requires, a sense-making in which objects of 
study are recognized as subjects in their own right. 
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